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NOTES
Liberalizing the Law in the Land
of the Lord:
Limits to the Americanization of
Israeli Religious Jurisprudence
ABSTRACT

This Note presents an analysis of American and Israeli
constitutional jurisprudence concerning matters of religion.
Recently, there has been a shift in Israel's High Court of Justice
toward implementing values of individual rights and religious
pluralism. Some have analogized this shift in focus to the role
played by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, fundamental
differences remain between the American and Israeli
approaches, stemming from divergent conceptions of national
identity encapsulated in the states' respective foundational legal
documents.
This Note examines the interplay of national identity and
religious jurisprudence and its effect on individuals' legal
rights. In doing so, it demonstrates how the legal entwinement
of religion and state will prevent Israel from fully implementing
American norms regarding matters of religion.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In July 2012, Israel's largest coalition government in recent
history fell apart over the failure of Israel's Parliament, the Knesset,
to enact an alternative to the Tal Law, which granted military draft
deferments to Orthodox Jews' enrolled full time as yeshiva (religious
school) students. 2 The controversy over military service stemmed
from a decision by the High Court of Justice3 (the High Court) that
found the deferment arrangement illegal and gave the Knesset twelve
months to fix the situation. 4 The decision sparked a divisive national

1.
Members of the Orthodox Jewish religion conform their behavior to
Halakha (Jewish religious law). Martin Edelman, A Portion of Animosity: The Politics
of the Disestablishment of Religion in Israel, 5 ISR. STUD. 204, 210 (2000). The most
conservative Orthodox Jews are also referred to as ultra-Orthodox or haredim. See, e.g.,
GERSHON SHAFIR & YOAV PELED, BEING ISRAELI: THE DYNAMICS OF MULTIPLE
CITIZENSHIP 41 (2002) (referencing Orthodox Jews as charedim). Although Orthodox
Judaism can be divided into many subsects, this Note will use the general term
Orthodox because Israeli laws generally treat Orthodox Jews as a singular group.
2.
See Jodi Rudoren, Israel's Unity Government Is Disbandingover Dispute on
Draft, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/world/
middleeast/unity-government-in-israel-disbanding-over-dispute-on-draft.html? r=1&
ref=jodirudoren (examining the unity coalition split between Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu and Shaul Mofaz, Kadima Party leader). See generally Policies
and Implementation Challenges in Israel Towards Conscriptionof Ultra-OrthodoxMen,
HORNSTEIN BLOG PROGRAM (Dec. 20, 2010), http://hornstein2011.blogspot.comI2010/12/
policies-and-implementation-challenges.html
[hereinafter Conscription of UltraOrthodox Men] (providing history of deferments for yeshiva students).
3.
The High Court of Justice is Israel's Supreme Court.
4.
See SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 1, at 275 (identifying instances of activism
demonstrated by the High Court); Edelman, supra note 1, at 215-16 (describing the
High Court's holding that granting deferments to full-time yeshiva students is illegal);
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debate about the place of religion in Israeli society, as well as the
proper role of the High Court over religious issues.5 Orthodox leaders
voiced vehement opposition to the Israeli legal system. Rabbi Ovadia
Yosef, spiritual leader of the Orthodox political party Shas, claimed
that Israeli judges "hate the Torah." 6
Clashes between Orthodox Jews and the High Court did not
begin with the Tal Law. Orthodox animosity stems from the judicial
system's role as a mechanism for changing the relationship between
religion and state within Israel. 7 Beginning in the 1980s, the High
Court became increasingly willing to intervene in matters not
previously considered appropriate for judicial review and began
deciding issues on the basis of individual rights, including freedom of
religion.8 Numerous High Court cases helped to erode the privileged
position occupied by the Orthodox establishment by virtue of its
status as the sole official religion of Israel's Jewish population.9
In its promotion of liberal individualistic values, the High Court
increasingly utilized American precedent. 10 This led a number of
commentators to refer to the "Americanization" of Israeli law. 11
However, the High Court faces severe limitations in its ability to
adopt an American approach to matters of religion. This Note
compares American and Israeli judicial approaches to the matter of
religion and state in order to illustrate the means through which the
High Court can change the religious status quo and the many
impediments to it doing so.
Examining American and Israeli religious jurisprudence
demonstrates how the two nations differ with respect to the
relationship between religion and state and how that relationship
affects and is affected by divergent conceptions of national identity.

Conscriptionof Ultra-OrthodoxMen, supra note 2, (providing subsequent history about
implementation).
See Aluf Bern, Influence of Israeli Arabs, Haredim on Israeli Society Spells
5.
End of Mandatory IDF Service, HAARETZ, July 3, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/
news/nationallinfluence-of-israei-arabs-haredim-on-israeli-society-spells-end-of-mandatoryidf-service-1.448570 (discussing the Tal Law's implications for Israeli national identity);
Jodi Rudoren, Israeli Identity Is at the Heart of a Debate on Service, N.Y. TIMES, July
12, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/world/middleeast/national-identity-atsocial
(discussing
heart-of-debate-on-israeli-military- service.html?ref=jodirudoren
tensions behind the Tal Law debate).
6.
Yair Ettinger, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef Bashes Israeli Legal System, Calling It
'Court of Gentiles,' HAARETZ, Aug. 19, 2012, http://www.haaretz.cominews/nationallrabbiovadia-yosef-bashes-israeli-legal-system-calling-it-court-of-gentiles.premium- 1.459202.
7.
See Edelman, supra note 1, at 209 ("As a result of their value orientation
and their willingness to take an activist role, the courts, especially the Supreme Court,
were being asked to rule on an ever-wider range of matters.").
SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 1, at 267-68; Edelman, supra note 1, at 209.
8.
9.
See Edelman, supra note 1, at 204, 217 (examining the transformation from
collectivism to individualism within Judaism).
10.
Id. at 209.
11.

Id.

236

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:233

The U.S. Supreme Court often faces cases involving religious matters,
including the Free Exercise Clause's guarantee of an individual's
freedom of religion1 2 and the Establishment Clause's prohibition on
government preference for one religion over another or religion over
nonreligion.1 3 However, in the United States an individual's religious
identification remains fully relegated to the private realm, free from
government interference. This reflects a liberal discourse of
citizenship whereby the nation theoretically and legally belongs
equally to citizens of all religions.14 In Israel, on the other hand, the
High Court has decided numerous cases in which it was required to
define a Jewish person.15 The court has not followed the traditional
Orthodox interpretation, expressing support for individual autonomy
over matters such as religious identification.16 Yet the very fact that
the court needed to decide the issue demonstrates the public nature of
religious identification. This reflects an ethnocultural discourse of
citizenship whereby individuals are defined by group membership.' 7
The determination of "who is a Jew" has important legal
ramifications for both an individual's rights and the state's identity
as the nation of the Jewish people. While the High Court may be able
to reign in the power of the Orthodox, the legal entwinement of
religion and state will preclude it from being able to become fully
"Americanized" in regards to matters of religion.
This Note begins by summarizing the history of Orthodox
Judaism's privileged position in society and the ways in which the
High Court has begun to erode that privileged position. Part III then
compares the divergent national identities reflected in American and
Israeli foundational legal documents and examines how differing
social conditions helped to create these national identities. Part IV
compares cases from the Supreme Court and the High Court in order

12.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

13.
14.

Id.
See

SAMUEL

P.

HUNTINGTON,

AMERICAN

POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF

DISHARMONY 24 (1981) (discussing how the U.S. Constitution turned liberal ideals into
fundamental legal entitlements that became the basis of community).
15.
See, e.g., HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, 23(2) PD 477 [1969]
(Isr.), in SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL 35, 47-48 (Asher

Felix Landau ed., 1971) [hereinafter SELECTED JUDGMENTS] (declining to rule on the
definition of "Jewish" in the majority opinion, but discussing the problems presented in
creating such a definition in dicta); HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior, 16
PD 2428 [1962] (Isr.) in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra, at 1, 3 ("The question of law
before us is very simply the meaning of the expression 'Jew' as used in the Law of
Return, 1950.").
16.
See Shalit, 23(2) PD 477, in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 15, at 35,
47-48 (stating in dicta that secular law, not religious law, must be used to consider the
definition of "Jewish" in certain contexts).
17.
See Rogers M. Smith, The 'American Creed" and American Identity: The
Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States, 41 W. POL. Q. 225, 234 (1998)
(defining ethnocultural discourse in the context of American citizenship laws).
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to examine how religious jurisprudence both affects and is affected by
national identity. Part V examines the High Court's ability to alter
the relationship between religion and state in Israel and the
limitations to its adoption of an Americanized approach to matters of
religion.

II. ORTHODOX JUDAISM IN ISRAELI SOCIETY
At Israel's independence, Orthodox Judaism was established as
the sole official religion of the Jewish people.18 Israel maintains links
with fourteen established religions,19 but the Jewish nature of the
state allowed the Orthodox to obtain a privileged position in the
state's social, political, and legal spheres. 20 However, beginning in the
1980s, the High Court began to challenge the religious status quo
through the rhetoric of individual rights and religious freedom. 2 1 The
High Court's decisions on religious matters that ran contrary to
Orthodox doctrine eroded the Orthodox establishment's monopoly on
questions of Judaism. 22 The cases involving the question of "who is a
Jew" provoked the greatest controversy because of their implications
for national identity.

A. Orthodox Judaism'sPrivileged Position in Israel
While only approximately 20 to 25 percent of Israel's Jewish
has obtained
Orthodox Judaism
population is Orthodox,
disproportionate prominence in Israeli public life.2 3 This prominence
is due to the role played by Orthodox Judaism as a source of
legitimacy for the Zionist national project. 24 Before the establishment
of the State of Israel in 1948, early Zionists faced a dilemma in their
quest to establish a homeland for the Jewish people. 25 Zionism
represented a secular nationalist movement, but the only cultural
attribute common to the Jewish nation was the Jewish religion, to

18.
Edelman, supra note 1, at 204.
19.
See id. at 206 ("Legally, then, Israel does not have an established religion;
it has a multiple establishment.").
20.
See id. ("There is no denying ... that Orthodox Judaism has functioned in
the Israeli polity as if it were the official state religion.").
21.
Id. at 208-09.
22.
See id. (examining the High Court's role as an objective vehicle for policy
transformation).
23.
Id. at 210.
24.
See SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 1, at 148-49 ("For Zionism, however, the
need to rely on primordial factors for legitimation and mobilization was particularly
acute, since there was no modern culture common to all Jews.").
25.
See id. ("[Dr. Jacob Israel de Haan] drafted a joint Arab-charedi statement
calling on Zionists to give up their efforts to establish a Jewish national home in
Palestine or face endless war with the Arabs.").
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which a vast majority of the Jewish population adhered. 26 The Zionist
leadership needed the cooperation of the Orthodox rabbis, as those
universally recognized as the spokesmen for the Jewish people, in
order to plausibly claim to speak on behalf of the worldwide Jewish
nation. 27 The theological justifications for the nationalist project,
offered by Orthodox rabbis, such as Ray Abraham Issac Kook, proved
invaluable to the Zionists in earning credibility among the masses of
Eastern European Jews.28
In 1947, in return for enhancing the legitimacy of Zionism, David
Ben-Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister, who at the time served as
the chairman of the Jewish Agency, sent a letter to the Orthodoxy's
executive agency outlining the "status quo agreement."29 It pledged
that the State of Israel would implement the prevailing religious
arrangements by designating Saturday (the Jewish Sabbath) as the
national day of rest, observing kashrut (Jewish dietary laws) in all
government kitchens, reserving exclusive jurisdiction over marriage
and divorce to religious courts, and preserving the autonomy of
religious education.3 0 Ben-Gurion further augmented those privileges
by granting military deferments for full-time Orthodox yeshiva
students.3 1 But Orthodox Judaism's role in the state extended beyond
those privileges articulated in the letter. For instance, Orthodox
Jewish institutions receive the vast majority of state appropriations
because all recognized religions receive state funding on a
proportional basis.3 2
Israel's electoral system of proportional representation has
allowed the Orthodox minority to wield a substantial amount of
political influence. None of the large secular parties has been able to
acquire a majority of seats in the Knesset since 1984.33 Thus, the
parties have relied on smaller religious parties to form coalition
governments.3 4 In return for their support, the secular parties allow

26.
See id. (discussing the acute need for Zionists to utilize religious symbols
because there was no modern culture common to all Jews).
27.
See id. at 137-38 (describing the interrelation between the Zionist
movement and Orthodox Jews).
IAN S. LUSTICK, FOR THE LORD AND THE LAND: JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN
28.
ISRAEL 31 (1988).
SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 1, at 140-41.
29.
Id.
30.
31.
See id. at 143-45 (discussing the impact of the military-service exemption
of yeshiva students). See generally Conscription of Ultra-Orthodox Men, supra note 2
(detailing a history of deferments for yeshiva students).
Edelman, supra note 1, at 206-07.
32.
Id. at 207-08.
33.
34.
For instance, Shas has formed part of every coalition government since its
first election to the Knesset in 1984. Ezra Kopelowitz, Religious Politics and Israel's
Ethnic Democracy, 6 ISR. STUD. 166, 169 (2001); see also SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 1,
at 146 ("The usual explanation for the privileges enjoyed by Orthodox Jews has been
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the religious parties to control the Ministry of Religion, as well as
various other ministries, such as Education, Interior, and Housing.35
The secular parties' reliance on the religious parties for coalitions
means a majority will rarely pass legislation that faces significant
Orthodox opposition.3 6

B. The Erosionof Orthodox Judaism'sPrivileged Position
Until 1995, Israel lacked a written constitution.3 7 Although the
Declaration of Independence explicitly called for a written
constitution, it faced stark opposition from early Zionist leaders.38
Ben-Gurion, in particular, was loath to accept any limitation on the
power of the Knesset that risked impeding its ability to act quickly
and decisively in the face of national security threats.3 9 Instead, the
Knesset passed the Harari Resolution, prescribing a process of
incremental accumulation of individual basic laws that would
eventually comprise the constitution. 40 However, these basic laws did
not possess the power to override other, nonbasic laws. 4 1 The absence
of fundamental, superior constitutional principles curtailed the
possibility of judicial review of legislation. 42
The situation changed in 1995 when the justices of the High
Court declared that Israel no longer lacked a written constitutionEleven Basic Laws that had been enacted by the Knesset would
function as one. 4 3 Moreover, Chief Justice Ahron Barak went so far as
to assert the power of American-style judicial review based on the
normative, superior nature of the constitution. 44 At the core of the

that Israel's system of proportional representation has enabled Orthodox political
parties to hold the balance needed for forming coalition governments.").
35.
Kopelowitz, supra note 34, at 170.
See Edelman, supra note 1, at 208-09 ("With the near equality in the
36.
Knesset of the left and right blocs, the Orthodox parties were so essential to any
cabinet coalition ...

that the theoretically "junior"partners had almost as much power

as the larger secular bloc with whom they chose to coalesce.").
37.
See id. at 209.
38.
Gary J. Jacobsohn, Alternate Pluralisms: Israeli and American
Constitutionalism in Comparative Perspective, 51 REV. POL. 159, 161 (1989) ("The
frustration of Israelis who have advocated a written constitution is traceable to the
Declaration of Independence, which explicitly refers to 'a Constitution to be drawn up
by the Constituent Assembly."').
39.
SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 1, at 261.
40.
See Jacobsohn, supra note 38, at 161 ("[T]his vaguely worded legislation left
unclear the status of the basic laws, just as it was silent as to a timetable for
completion of the Constitution.").
41.
Id. at 262.
42.
Id.
43.
Edelman, supra note 1, at 209.
44.
Id.; see also Ahron Barak, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy, 3
IsR. STUD. 6, 7 (1998) ("Before a judicial determination, the statute or basic law spoke
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new constitution stood two basic laws dealing with individual rights,
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Freedom. 45 Under these laws, the court began to take an activist
approach to protecting individual rights, consonant with the liberal
values that had come to dominate Israeli society. 46 While a majority
of the decisions dealt with socioeconomic freedoms, the court became
increasingly willing to tackle religious issues. 4 7
The adoption of a constitution coincided with a larger shift in
Israeli society from a collectivist ethos that emphasized communal
interest and social justice during the state's formative years to an
individualistic ethos that emphasized self-reliance and personal
rights. 4 8 The individualistic ethos pervading society led to growing
dissatisfaction among non-Orthodox Jews with Orthodox restrictions
on their individual autonomy. 49 Non-Orthodox Jews comprised
approximately 75 percent of Israel's Jewish population, but the status
quo arrangements and electoral process served to subordinate the
majority's religious views to those of the Orthodox minority.50 The
failure of the electoral process led many dissatisfied Israelis to turn to
the courts, asserting a freedom of religion akin to that in the United
States.5 '
A number of High Court decisions threatened the Orthodoxy's
privileged status in Israel. For example, the High Court restricted the
power of the Rabbinical Courts by ruling that they did not have the
power to impose sanctions on Jews who refused to accept their
jurisdiction in civil suits. 5 2 The High Court also required the Ministry
of Religious Affairs to set aside funds for non-Orthodox religious
institutions. s3 When the government, under pressure from the
Orthodox Jews, denied a permit to a company seeking to import
nonkosher meat, the court found the denial unconstitutional under
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. 54 Confronting the very divisive
issue of Orthodox military service, a unanimous panel of eleven

with a number of voices. After a judicial determination, the statute or basic law speaks
with a single voice.").
45.
See SHAFIR & PELED, supranote 1, at 263 (describing the laws as enhancing
liberal citizenship rights in the civil, political, and economic spheres).
See id. at 267-68 (explaining the court's gradual shift to a more activist role
46.
in promoting liberal values).
See generally id. at 274-75 (highlighting the legal developments of High
47.
Court decisions on religious issues).
48.
See Edelman, supra note 1, at 205 (characterizing the "first Israeli
republic" from 1948 to 1973 as collectivist and the "second Israeli republic" from 1992
to the present as individualistic).
49.
Id. at 210.
50.
Id.
51.

Id.

52.
53.
54.

Id. at 214.
Id.
Edelman, supra note 1, at 222.
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justices found the arrangement granting deferments to full-time
yeshiva students to be illegal. 55 The Orthodox perceived these
decisions as threatening its position as the official religion of Israel
and its goal to establish a state based upon Halakha (Jewish religious
law).
However, Orthodox Jews found the controversy over "who is a
Jew" most threatening because its resolution carries both practical
and symbolic effects for the Jewish nature of Israel.56 The first line of
"who is a Jew" cases dealt with the degree to which the ethnic
definition of Jewish corresponded to the religious definition for
purposes of citizenship. The Law of Return (1950) 5 and the
Nationality Law (1952)58 gave Jews the right to immigrate to Israel
and automatically obtain citizenship, respectively. These laws have
largely sustained the Jewish majority within the state.5 9 In the 1962
Brother Daniel case, the High Court faced the question of whether a
person who converted from Judaism to Christianity could be
considered Jewish for purposes of the Law of Return.6 0 The court did
not accept a completely subjective definition of Jewishness, whereby
an individual could be defined as Jewish merely by self-identifying
with the Jewish community. 61 Rather, the court found that the term
"Jew" should be interpreted in conformance with the understanding
of the Jewish community. 62 However, the relevant Jewish community
was not confined to Orthodox Jews. 63 The court ruled that a convert
to another religion did not qualify as a Jew. 64 The ruling departed
from the Orthodox definition, which does not exclude people who join
other religions.6 5
In 1967, the court confronted the issue of Jewish identity in
regard to the Population Registry Law. 66 In Israel's population

55.
Id. at 215-16; see also SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 1, at 152-53 (discussing
the strategy in the late 1990s to "reshape the nature of state-religion relations.");
Conscription of Ultra-OrthodoxMen, supra note 2 (providing subsequent history about
implementation).
56.
See SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 1, at 145 (describing the political
importance of the question in view of the role played by ethnonational discourse in
Israel); Edelman, supra note 1, at 217 ("At issue is which individuals are entitled to
participate fully in the shaping the nature of the Jewish State.").
57.
Law of Return (1950), 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1949-1950) (Isr.), amended by
Law of Return (Amendment 5730-1970).
58.
Nationality Law (1952), 5712-1952, 6 LSI 50 (1952) (Isr.).
Edelman, supra note 1, at 217.
59.
60.
HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior (BrotherDaniel), 16 PD 2428
[19621 (Isr.) in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 15, at 1, 10.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 23.
See Edelman, supra note 1, at 218 (describing opposing notions of
65.
Jewishness).
Id.
66.
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register, citizens are classified according to "nationality," defined by
ethnicity. 67 The Shalit case involved a petition by the father of minor
children demanding that the registrar enter his children as belonging
to the Jewish nationality, even though they were not affiliated with
the Jewish religion according to Halakha.68 The court held that the
term Jew should carry the same meaning as in the Law of Return.6 9
According to Justice Berinson, the definition of the Jewish nation
depended not on Halakha,but rather on the "views of the enlightened
section of the population."70 However, the court did not completely
abandon religious criteria. The children did have ties to the Jewish
faith, as their father was Jewish and their mother did not profess to
follow ay other religion.7 1 Heated public debate over the Shalit case
caused the Knesset to pass a law in 1970 that defined a Jew for
purposes of the Law of Return and the Population Registry Law as a
person born of a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism who is not a
member of another religion. 72 This departed from the Orthodox
definition by failing to require conversion according to the Orthodox
interpretation of Halakha and automatically excluded members of
other religions.7 3
The other line of "who is a Jew" cases involved conversion. In
Miller v. Minister of the Interior, the High Court ruled that an
individual that converted to Judaism under non-Orthodox auspices in
the Diaspora was a Jew according to the Law of Return and had to be
registered as such under the Population Registry. 74 In 1995,
Goldstein v. Minister of the Interior extended the Miller holding by
finding that the Minister of the Interior did not have the power to
refuse to register as Jewish individuals who had been converted to
Judaism by non-Orthodox rabbis in Israel. 7 The court's official

67.
See id. (stating the Population Registry Law does not limit Jewishness to
the halakhic definition of a person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism).
HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, 23(2) PD 477 [1969] (Isr.), in
68.
SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 15, at 35, 35. According to Halakha, a person is
Jewish if born to a Jewish mother. The children had a Jewish father and a non-Jewish
mother.
See id. at 187-88 (stating that the Law of Return could not be interpreted
69.
using religious law).
Id.
70.
Id. at 35; see also Benjamin Akzin, Who Is a Jew? A Hard Case, 5 ISR. L.
71.
REV. 259, 263 (1970) (arguing that full dissociation from religion as criterion for Jewish
nationality would have been premature and amounted to judicial arbitrariness counter
to public opinion).
Edelman, supra note 1, at 218.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 219 (citing HCJ Miller v. Minister of the Interior, 40(4) PD 436 [1988]
74.
(Isr.)).
Id. at 219 (citing HCJ 1031/93 Chava-Goldstein v. Minister of the Interior
75.
[1995] (Isr.)).
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recognition of non-Orthodox Judaism threatened the status of
Orthodox Judaism as the definition of Judaism in Israel.
However, the resolution of "who is a Jew" has implications that
reach far beyond the Orthodox establishment. Because Israel defines
itself as a "Jewish democracy," the decision of who belongs to the
Jewish community affects the state's national identity. It also affects
the individual rights of citizens within the state. Israel's identity as
the nation of the Jewish people led to a plethora of legal entitlements
reserved specifically to members of the Jewish community. The
determination of whether or not an individual is a Jew thus carries
significant consequences. These implications illustrate the limits to
the influence of American jurisprudence over its Israeli counterpart.
Religious identification may carry significant social consequences for
a citizen of the United States, but it will not affect the individual's
legal entitlements. This difference arises from the divergent national
identities encapsulated within the states' respective foundational
legal documents.

III. THE TANGLED WEB OF LAw, RELIGION, AND IDENTITY
The law, religion, and national identity interact in mutually
reinforcing ways in the United States and Israel. American
jurisprudence encapsulates the liberal, individualistic values
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution adopted those
values because they reflected the United States' relatively pluralistic,
open society.7 6 Judicial decisions that rely on those values further
reinforce the United States' identity as a nation of all its citizens.
Israeli jurisprudence, on the other hand, demonstrates the
ethnocultural discourse that pervades Israel's Declaration of
Independence and Basic Laws. Those foundational legal documents
stemmed from the fractured, group-oriented nature of Israeli
society."7 Judicial decisions in Israel, in turn, reinforce the state's
identity as the nation of the Jewish people.

A. Conceptions of NationalIdentity
Differences between American and Israeli approaches to religion
and state arise from divergent conceptions of national identity
embodied in each state's foundational legal texts. The U.S.
Constitution defines the state through the enunciation of liberal
democratic values, including the separation of religion and

76.
See Jacobsohn, supra note 38, at 174-75 (describing divergent forms of
pluralism in the United States and Israel).
77.
Id.
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government in the Establishment Clause.78 The Israeli Declaration of
Independence, on the other hand, defines the state as the nation of
the Jewish people. 79 Although the term Jewish includes ethnic and
cultural dimensions, the Jewish religion plays a prominent role in
defining those dimensions.8 0 As the sole official religion of the Jewish
people, Orthodox Judaism holds a superior position socially,
politically, and legally within the state. 81 In contrast, despite
numerous divisions within the American public, the nation legally
belongs to all its citizens, regardless of ethnicity or religion. In Israel,
while all ethnicities and religions enjoy full civil and political rights,
the state remains the nation of the Jewish people.
1.

American National Identity

In his book American Creed, Samuel Huntington argued that
national identity and political principle are inseparable in the United
States. 82 He posited that Americans have nothing important in
common aside from the liberal values embodied in the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution.8 3 These liberal values, rooted in
the thinking of the Enlightenment, include concern for universal
human rights, religious toleration, and the promotion of commerce
and the sciences. 84 The Declaration of Independence articulated the
ideals of a liberal democracy in its statement, "All men are created
equal," and its enumeration of natural rights belonging to all
citizens. 85 The Constitution then transformed those ideals into
fundamental legal entitlements. Huntington thus concluded that this
fundamental constitutional law became the basis of community. 86 He
contrasted the American experience to that of most other nations,
where national identity evolved from commonality of ancestors,

78.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
THE DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL para.
79.
10 (Isr. 1948) ("This right is the right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own
fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign state.").
80.
See SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 1, at 149 (detailing how the Jewish
religion was incorporated into the state); Sammy Smooha, Ethnic Democracy: Israel as
the Archetype, ISR. STUD. 198, 202 (1997) ("[Tlhere is no separation in Israel between
religion and nationality, religion and ethnicity (that is, a person belonging to the
Jewish people or born a Jew cannot simultaneously be a member of any religion other
than Judaism), and religion and state.").
81.
See Edelman, supra note 1, at 206 ("There is no denying ... that Orthodox
Judaism has functioned in the Israeli polity as if it were the official state religion.").
HUNTINGTON, supra note 14.
82.
Id.
83.
84.
Smith, supra note 17, at 229.
85.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
HUNTINGTON, supra note 14, at 30 ("In other countries, one can abrogate
86.
the constitution without abrogating the nation. The United States does not have that
choice.").
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experiences, ethnic background, language, culture, and often
religion.8 7
Critics have pointed out limitations in Huntington's analysis.
For example, Rogers M. Smith found that a conception of American
nationality based solely on liberalism failed to take account of the
shortcomings of liberal ideals in responding to the problems of
community identity in American society. 88 He emphasized the
presence of conflicting discourses of citizenship that gained
prominence in American public life throughout the nation's history.8 9
Republicanism, in its emphasis on shared virtuous endeavor and the
common good, was capable of supporting nonliberal conceptions of
citizenship characterized by social homogeneity.9 0 Ethnoculturalism
conflicted even more starkly with liberal ideals in its articulation of
an American community characterized by an array of particular
cultural orientations and customs, including Northern European
ancestry, Protestantism, and the white race. 91 In support of his
theory, Smith documented the ways the nation's laws of citizenship
often contained requirements (e.g., place of birth, ethnicity, and
gender) that demonstrated a more exacting standard for membership
92
in the community than adherence to constitutional values.
While Smith correctly points out the multifaceted nature of the
American community, the extent to which the liberal values
articulated in the Constitution shaped American national identity
should not be underestimated. The Constitution defines the United
States as a nation of all its citizens. The rights it articulates belong to
every American citizen regardless of ethnicity or religion. Of course,
this has not always been the case. For a long portion of the nation's
history, individuals were denied social, political, and legal rights on
bases such as race and gender. But the addition of the Civil Rights
Amendments9 3 and the Nineteenth Amendment 94 went a long way
toward ensuring that the rights guaranteed by the Constitution
belong to the entire American people. Individuals identify with many
different subgroups, such as races or religions, but there remains an
overarching American identity.9 5 The government does not classify a
citizen's nationality based on ethnicity or religion. Rather, every
citizen is simply an American citizen. And while the nature of certain

87.
Id. at 23.
88.
Smith, supra note 17, at 225-26.
Id.
89.
90.
Id. at 231.
91.
Id. at 234.
92.
Id. at 226.
93.
U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII-XV.
94.
Id. amend. XIX.
95.
See Jacobsohn, supra note 38, at 175 ("[American] pluralism acknowledges
groups as collections of individuals, not as units whose corporate identity carries with
it any claim upon the state for specific entitlement.").
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laws make them applicable only to a particular subgroup, the
Constitution does not prioritize any one group over another. Its
principles apply to the entire American people, and as such, it serves
to bind them together as a unitary community.
2.

Israeli National Identity

An inherent tension exists in Israel's dual character as Jewish
and democratic. On the one hand, Israel purports to be the nation of
the Jewish people. On the other hand, it purports to be the state of all
its citizens. Official Zionist ideology contends that the two principles
are perfectly compatible, and the state maintains that it is fully
committed to both. 96 Israel's Declaration of Independence guarantees
full civil and political rights to all its citizens.97 However, it defines
peoplehood in terms of ancestral bonds, rather than liberal ideals, by
tracing the collective history of the Jewish people from biblical times
through the Holocaust.9 8 The Jewish religion, embodied officially by
the Orthodox, permeates almost all facets of the state.99 Sometimes
religion plays a symbolic role, influencing aspects of the state such as
the official language (Hebrew), state emblems (star of David and
menorah), and national holidays. 1 00 Other times, religion plays a
direct role in determining legal entitlements.o1 0
A number of Israeli laws reflect the Jewish nature of the state
and give de jure recognition to the de facto dominance of the Jewish
population. The Law of Return and the Nationality Law allow any
Jew, and certain classes of relatives, to immigrate to Israel and
automatically obtain citizenship. 0 2 On the other hand, these laws
permit the immigration and naturalization of non-Jews only under
certain limited circumstances and completely exclude Palestinian
Arabs. 0 3 A recent High Court decision upheld an amendment to the
citizenship laws that forbids Palestinian Arabs from obtaining

96.

Smooha, supra note 80, at 206.

97.

THE DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL para.

13 (Isr. 1948).
Id. paras. 1-8.
98.
99.
See Smooha, supra note 80, at 205-07 (describing Israel as "a state of and
for the Jews," and elaborating ways in which Jewishness is given a superior status in
society).
Id. at 205-06.
100.
101.
See id. at 206 (describing a preference for Jews in immigration legislation
and how Israel confers a special legal status on charitable organizations that cater to
Jews only).
102.
Law of Nationality, 5712-1952, 6 LSI 50 (1952) (Isr.); Law of Return, 57101950, 4 LSI 114 (1949-1950) (Isr.), amended by Law of Return (Amendment 57301970).
103.
Smooha, supra note 80, at 206.
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citizenship through marriage to an Israeli citizen. 104 The Foundations
of Law Act, enacted in 1980, states that if the High Court encounters
a legal issue and does not find a solution in the words of legislators,
in precedent, or by way of analogy, it should rule according to the
principles of liberty, justice, equity, and peace of the Jewish
heritage. 0 5 Amendment 8 to Basic Law: the Knesset prohibits a list
of candidates from participating in Knesset elections if the party's
goals or acts either explicitly or implicitly include denial of the
existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.' 06
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Freedom both contain clauses that define their purposes as
grounding in a basic law the values of Israel as a Jewish and
democratic state. 107 Other laws indirectly benefit the Jewish
community to the exclusion of others. For instance, the Jewish
Agency and Jewish National Fund receive special legal status and
fulfill quasi-governmental functions, such as development and leasing
of land and support of cultural activities.' 0 8 Both institutions are
obliged by their own constitutions to serve only Jews. 0 9
Chief Justice Ahron Barak sought to reconcile Jewish and
democratic values by defining Judaism in a way that makes it
indistinguishable from liberalism. He said:
The fundamental values of Judaism are the . . . values of the love of
mankind, the sanctity of life, social justice ... human dignity, the rule
of law over the legislator . . .. [T]he values of the State of Israel as a
Jewish state must not be identical with Jewish law .... Indeed, the
values of the State of Israel as a Jewish state are those universal
values that are common to all members of democratic society and that
110
grew out of Jewish tradition and Jewish history.

While Barak's interpretation could offer a more inclusive conception
of national identity, it is by no means universally shared. 111
Moreover, it fails to reflect the reality that the state was created to
serve as the homeland of the Jewish people and its primary national
goal remains serving the interests of the Jewish people." 2 The state

104.
Batsheva Sobelman, Israeli High Court Upholds Controversial Citizenship
Law, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world-now/2012/01/
israel-passes-laws-restricting-arabs-asylum-seekers.html.
Smooha, supra note 80, at 206.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
SHAFIR & PELED, supranote 1, at 273.
110.
See, e.g., Nadim Rouhana & As'ad Ghanem, The Crisis of Minorities in
111.
Ethnic States: The Case of the Palestinian Citizens of Israel, 30 INT'L J. MIDDLE E.
STUD. 321 (arguing that Israel is an ethnic nondemocracy).
See SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 1, at 145 (pointing out the importance of
112.
determining "who is a Jew?" in defining Jewish collectivity and the privileged status of
Jews in society).
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defines nationality based on ethnicity, which is intimately connected
to religion in the case of Jewish nationality.11 3 It does not recognize
an overarching Israeli nationality.1 14 It further classifies its citizens
on the basis of religious community.115 .Each community's religious
court has full jurisdiction over matters of personal status, including
marriage, divorce, wills, child custody, and burial." 6 Civil marriage
and divorce do not even exist in Israel.11 7 While individuals may selfidentify with the larger Israeli community, the state does not embody
the Israeli community. Rather, it is comprised of multiple
communities representing distinct ethnicities and religions, and its
national identity is defined by one particular community.

B. National Identity as a Reflection of Social Conditions
The divergent conceptions of American and Israeli national
identity embodied in each state's foundational legal texts reflect the
differing social conditions that prevail in each country. Although U.S.
history contains myriad examples of social divisions, American legal
history reflects a move towards greater integration and tolerance." 8
While the vision of the United States as a melting pot may not ever
be perfectly realized in practice, it is not a vision without any
grounding in reality." 9 In Israel, citizens feel a stronger personal
identification with religion and ethnicity, and divisions within Israeli
society are more visible and entrenched.12 0
1.

American Pluralism

The Constitution begins with the phrase "we the people."121 The
"people" referred to theoretically includes the entirety of the
American people.1 22 However, sharp religious and ethnic divisions
once permeated the state's social, political, and legal spheres.1 23 For
instance, the privileges of citizenship, most notably voting, originally
belonged exclusively to white, male landowners. 124 Racial
classifications provide an example of the most extreme type of

Id.
113.
Smooha, supranote 80, at 211.
114.
Id. at 206.
115.
Id.
116.
Edelman, supra note 1, at 206.
117.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding that a state ban on
118.
interracial marriage violates Equal Protection); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (finding segregation in public schools inherently unequal).
See Jacobsohn, supra note 38, at 174-75 (describing American pluralism
119.
and intergroup inequality as "relatively unproblematic" in comparison with its Israeli
counterpart).
See id. at 174 (discussing the principally irreconcilable differences between
120.
secular and religious Jews, as well as Israel's intense social cleavages).
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division; black citizens were once relegated to the status of property
rather than people.125 The laws subjugating black citizens reflected
the dominant white society's belief in the inferiority of the black
race.126 Judicial decisions dealing with questions of race regularly
reflected societal prejudice. For instance, in State v. Cantey, the Court
of Appeals of South Carolina faced the question of whether to classify
persons with one-sixteenth African blood as white or black.1 27 The
judge found it proper to consider the men's reputations, stating, "It
may be well and proper, that a man of worth, honesty, industry and
respectability, should have the rank of a white man, while a
vagabond of the same degree of blood should be confined to the
inferior caste."128
Over time, the de jure and de facto divisions between the races
began to erode. Although group divisions retain continued importance
through the present day, American legal history reflects a move
towards greater integration and tolerance. 129 The Thirteenth, 130
Fourteenth, 131 and Fifteenth 132 Amendments, respectively,
eliminated slavery, enfranchised black citizens, and prohibited
discrimination based on race. These Amendments did not fully
eradicate legal distinctions between the races, but future cases, such
as those outlawing segregation l 33 and prohibitions on interracial
marriage, 134 made significant strides towards making American
society more fully inclusive. Changes in the legal status of race often
helped to change the social status of race. For instance, the

U.S. CONST. pmbl.
121.
See HUNTINGTON, supra note 14, at 24 (arguing that what Americans have
122.
in common is their political principles).
See, e.g., Jacobsohn, supra note 38, at 170-75 (giving examples of cases
123.
exemplifying ethnocentric Americanism). See generally CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN THE
UNITED STATES (Larry L. Naylor ed., 1997) (examining the diverse cultural groupings
that make up American culture).
See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT To VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
124.
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 7-17 (2009) (describing the beginnings of
suffrage in post-Revolutionary America).
See generally IRA BERLIN, GENERATIONS OF CAPTIVITY: A HISTORY OF
125.
AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVES 4 (2003) (describing how slaves were "[d]efined as property
and condemned as little more than beasts").
See Walter Johnson, The Slave Trader, the White Slave and the Politics of
126.
Racial Determinationin the 1850s, 87 J. AM. HIST. 13, 13-38 (2000) (discussing societal
reactions provoked by a trial to determine the race of a female slave who appeared
white).
20 S.C.L. (614 Hill) (1835).
127.
128.
Id. at 2.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
129.
U.S. 483 (1954).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIll.
130.
Id. amend. XIV.
131.
Id. amend. XV.
132.
133.
See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
134.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
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mandatory integration of public education forced citizens of different
races to interact with each other and be exposed to alternative
viewpoints. 3 5 On the other hand, changes in the social status of race
often precipitated the changes in legal status.1 36
Race has by no means disappeared from American public
discourse, and divisions based on race are still reflected in numerous
ways. In the legal sphere, the Supreme Court still struggles with
issues of race. For instance, classifications that benefit a racial group
that suffered from past discrimination produce sharp divisions among
the Justices, with Justice Thomas calling for "a color blind
Constitution" 137 and Justice Stevens finding racial distinctions
permissible for remedial purposes. 138 And race provides only one
stark example of the social divisiveness of group identity, with other
notable examples being gender and sexuality. 139 Although the
Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment
prohibit legal distinctions between members of different religions,
religion has been the cause of much social hostility. 140 The aftermath
of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, witnessed a
significant increase in anti-Muslim sentiment within American
society, demonstrated recently by the passionate protests over the
erection of mosques in a number of different cities. 141 But while
Brown has sparked much debate over its triumphs and shortcomings. For
135.
some background on the matter, see generally Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown
v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693 (examining the litigation campaign
preceding the case to show how Brown and its legacy illuminate enduring features of
the U.S. political system).
136.
See Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in
the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 272-98 (2005) (describing how intraracial
community and institution building worked in conjunction with antidiscrimination
litigation efforts).
137.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 377 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("[E]very time the government places citizens on racial
registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us
all.").
138.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 276 (1995) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (differentiating between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat).
139.
See generally, e.g., VICTORIA OLWELL, THE GENIUS OF DEMOCRACY:
FICTIONS OF GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1945 (2011)
(discussing the role of women and their "genius" in the social and political context).
140.
For a contemporary example, see Robert P. Jones, What the Contraception
Controversy Taught Us About Religion in America, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/figuring-faith/post/what-the-contraceptioncontroversy-taught-us-about-religion-in-america/2012/02/17/gQAoWPKKRblog.htm1
(discussing the implications of Catholic bishops' opposition to the Obama
administration's requirement that employers provide no-cost birth control to their
employees through insurance plans).
141.
See, e.g., Muslim Community Center in Lower Manhattan (Park 51), N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/
p/park5l/index.html?scp=l-spot&sq=ground%20zero%20mosque&st=cse
(discussing
the controversy surrounding the construction of a Muslim community center in
Manhattan).
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American society is by no means perfectly harmonious, a wide array
of different groups manage to coexist relatively peacefully. 142 The
nation has not been torn apart by ethnic civil war like many other
countries throughout the world. The same laws govern all citizens,
and the same courts enforce those laws for all citizens. American
citizens might not have friendly relations with all their fellow
citizens, but they nevertheless comprise a singular people.
2.

Israeli Pluralism

In Israeli society, citizens tend to feel a stronger sense of
affiliation with subgroups rather than the larger national
collective.1 43 Although the divisions in Israeli society contain many
nuances, three major, overarching cleavages stand out: religious and
secular Jews, Ashkenazi (European) and Sephardi (Arab) Jews, and
Jews and non-Jewish Arabs. 144 The divide between Jews and Arabs
has proven the most intractable, in large part because of its
implications for national identity.1 45
Sephardi Jews are people of the Jewish faith with historical
links to the Arab Muslim world. 146 After 1948, Israel received a large
influx of Sephardi Jews.147 These Jews were relegated to a form of
second-class citizenship.14 8 In public discourse, Sephardi Jews were
referred to as just another "ethnic group," as opposed to Ashkenazi
Jews, who constituted normative society.149 Socioeconomic conditions
have reinforced the power disparities, with large gaps persisting
between the groups in terms of occupation, income, and education. 5 0
However, Sephardi Jews have always retained the distinct
advantage of being a part of the Jewish people, to whom the nation

See Jacobsohn, supra note 38, at 175 ("[In] a limited number of Western
142.
states . . . 'pluralism and intergroup inequality are relatively unproblematic."').
See id. at 174 (discussing a study that revealed "Israeli cleavages are more
143.
intense, more superimposed, less crosscutting, and more political in nature" than those
in the United States).
Id.
144.
145.
See Smooha, supra note 80, at 220 (detailing how the Israeli concept of a
"good citizen" necessarily excludes Arab citizens).
146.
Sephardi Jews are also referred to as Mizrahim. See generally Ella Shohat,
The Invention of the Mizrahim, 29 J. PALESTINE STUD. 5 (1999) (examining the
paradoxical effects on Arab Jews of their rival nationalisms).
SHAFIR & PELED, supranote 1, at 74.
147.
See id. at 79-81 (discussing the settlement of immigrants in "development
148.
towns" where occupational and income gaps were common).
See id. at 75-79 (discussing perceived distinction between "those who were
149.
members of the virtuous republican community and those whose membership in the
Yishuv [pre-statehood Jewish community in Palestine] was based on ethno-national
ties only").
150.
See id. at 81-87 (describing the disparity in occupational and income status
between the Mizrahim and the Ashkenazi and the Mizrahim's inadequate educational
structure due to discrimination).
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belongs.1 51 Thus, they have been able to use their Jewish identity to
bolster their political and social status.1 5 2 Faced with a dual identity,
Jewish and Arab, Sephardi Jews sought to ally themselves with the
Jewish community by emphasizing an ethnocultural discourse. 153 For
instance, Shas, the only successful Sephardi political party, is also an
Orthodox party whose platform emphasizes the need to enhance the
role of the Jewish religion in public and private life.1 54 Moreover,
Sephardi Jews have often proven the most hostile to integration with
Palestinians.1 5 5
Ultimately, however sharp the divide between Ashkenazi and
Sephardi Jews or religious and secular Jews, the groups remain part
of a larger shared community: the Jewish people. The societal
cleavages among Jews are akin to the societal cleavages found in the
United States. The different groups do not always have friendly
relations, but they comprise a singular people, and the nation belongs
to that singular people.
Non-Jewish Arabs present a different story because they are
56
classified as a distinct people, outside of normative Jewish society.
Israel institutionalized group separation when it adopted the
Ottoman practice of classifying individuals according to religion and
allowing each religious community full jurisdiction over matters of
personal status, such as marriage, divorce, and child custody.1 57 The
system of communal autonomy was meant to minimize strife between
religious minorities and the state.15 8 This institutional arrangement
both reflected the de facto separation between groups within society
and helped to perpetuate it.' 5 9 In the case of non-Jewish Arabs, the
separation goes well beyond religious matters. 160 Israeli Arabs

See id. at 92 (discussing the concept of ethnonationalism running through
151.
Meir Kahane's election).
152.
See id. (explaining how an ethnonationalist view dominated the candidates
in the elections of 1988 who "more than tripled their strength").
153.
See id. (discussing the Mizrahim contention that societal inclusion should
be based on "mere Jewishness" rather than the internalization of Zionist or Israeli
values).
See id. at 93-94 (discussing the meaning and implementation of Shas's
154.
slogan, "restore the crown to its old glory").
For a more comprehensive history of Israel's radical right-wing parties, see
155.
generally EHUD SPRINZAK, THE ASCENDANCE OF ISRAEL's RADIcAL RIGHT (1991)
(examining the radical right from its origins to its impact on Jewish culture).
See Smooha, supra note 80, at 221 (describing how Arab citizens constitute
156.
a separate and unequal minority).
157.
See Edelman, supra note 1, at 206-07 (describing the pervasive role of the
government over various aspects of private life).
See id.
158.
159.
Id. at 207 (explaining the intended convergence of the different societal
groups toward the greater good).
160.
See Smooha, supra note 80, at 221 ('The state recognizes the Arabs as a
religious, linguistic, and cultural minority.").
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comprise a minority of the population, roughly 16 percent. 161 The
Arab community is granted rights to maintain a publically funded
separate system of Arab education, to cultivate their Arab culture,
and to conduct cultural ties with other Palestinians and the Arab
world. 162 But this autonomy comes at the price of integration into the
larger society. Certain rights of citizenship are categorically denied to
Israeli Arabs. For instance, even an Arab citizen who so desired
would be forbidden from serving in the army. 163 While most Arab
citizens probably do not have such a desire, participation in the
military confers certain benefits, some tangible, such as veterans'
financial benefits, and some symbolic, such as social status, that Arab
citizens cannot enjoy. 164 Moreover, because Israel requires all other
citizens to serve in the military, with certain exemptions, military
service becomes an important shared experience that serves to foster
community ties. 16 5
The separation of the Jewish and Arab communities stems from
the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict that began with the war in 1948
and continues up to the present-day failure of peace talks. 6 6 At the
heart of the conflict lies a struggle over national identity. 16 7 People on
both sides see the conflict in zero-sum terms-the state formed on the
land formerly known as Palestine can either be a Jewish nation or an
Arab nation.16 8 The frequent references in Israeli discourse to the
"demographic threat" posed by the Arab population demonstrate this
sentiment.' 6 9 If enough additional people of Arab descent became

Id. at 202. Only Arabs within the Green Line, demarcating the boundary
161.
between Israel and the Palestinian Territories, receive Israeli citizenship. Arabs in
East Jerusalem are excluded.
162.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 202. Arab citizens do have the option of participating as volunteers in
163.
Israel's national service program. Arab participation in civil service has increased
nearly tenfold from 250 in 2007 to 2,400 in 2012. The debate over Orthodox military
service also included disagreement over compelling Arab national service. See Jodi
Rudoren, Service to Israel Tugs at Identity of Arab Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/world/middleeast/service-to-israel-tugs-at-arabcitizens-identity.html? r=1&ref=jodirudoren (discussing the struggle for Israeli Arabs
to reconcile their identity as citizens of a Jewish state).
164.
See Smooha, supra note 80, at 217 ("The extensive use of military service as
a criterion for the allocation of benefits is very striking, because most Jews serve in the
army, whereas most Arabs do not.").
See id. at 202 ("Israel is a deeply divided society that needs
165.
consociationalism.").
A full discussion of the Arab-Israeli conflict goes beyond the scope of this
166.
Note. For a detailed history, see generally CHARLES D. SMITH, PALESTINE AND THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (7th ed. 2010).
See Smooha, supra note 80, at 212 (discussing the distinction between
167.
Jewishness and Zionism).
See id. (discussing the implications of the Jewish people constituting the
168.
majority and therefore exerting dominance over the nation).
See Gideon Alon & Aluf Benn, Netanyahu: Israel's Arabs Are the Real
169.
Demographic Threat, HAARETZ (Dec. 18, 2003, 12:00 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/

254

VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[voL. 46:233

citizens of Israel such that the state became majority Arab, clearly
the state would not retain its Jewish character. That situation goes
against the state's avowed purpose of serving as the homeland for the
Jewish people. 170 This concern creates the perception that Arab
citizens are a threat to the state's core national goal, which leads to
legal and societal consequences.' 7 1
Amendment 8 to Basic Law: the Knesset exemplifies the
Knesset's attempt to safeguard the Jewish character of the state.172
Amendment 8 provides that a list of candidates shall not participate
in Knesset elections if the party's list of goals or acts explicitly or
implicitly includes the denial of the existence of the State of Israel as
the state of the Jewish people.1 73 While political parties representing
Israeli Arabs do hold seats in the Knesset,174 the inclusion of the term
"implicitly" provides ample leeway for their exclusion. Moreover, Arab
parties have not yet been included in coalition governments because
of their disagreement over issues such as retaining the JewishZionist character of the state and forming a Palestinian state.175 The
laws that relegate Arabs to an inferior status comport with public
opinion.17 6 In the social sphere, antagonism between Jews and Arabs
remains widespread.1 7 7 In a particularly telling 1995 survey, 74.1
78
percent of Jews said that the state should prefer Jews to Arabs.'
The divide between Jews and Arabs demonstrates how the
Israeli conception of pluralism differs from its American counterpart.
Jews and Arabs generally do not view themselves as part of the same
community. 79 Rather, they constitute two distinct cultures that must
share the same space and accommodate each other. And while the
180
state accommodates multiple groups, it only belongs to one.

print-edition/news/netanyahu-israel-s-arabs-are-the-real-demographic-threat- 1.109045
(recounting how, speaking at the Herzliya Conference on security, then-Finance
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remarked that "[i]f there is a demographic problem, and
there is, it is with the Israeli Arabs who will remain Israeli citizens").
* 170.
See Smooha, supra note 80, at 212 (discussing Israel's dominance of the
Hebrew language and the Jewish culture and institutions).
See id. ("From a Jewish viewpoint, rejection of Zionism as an ideology and
171.
as a force shaping the state is tantamount to rejecting the state itself.")
172.
Basic Law: The Knesset, 5741-1981, S.H. No. 1016 p. 168 (Isr.).
Smooha, supra note 80, at 206.
173.
Current Knesset Members of the Eighteenth Knesset, KNESSET,
174.
(last visited Dec. 20,
http://www.knesset.gov.illmk/eng/mkindex-currenteng.asp?view=
2012).
Smooha, supranote 80, at 209.
175.
Id. at 220.
176.
See id. ("[M]ost Jews think that the Arabs do not deserve equal
177.
rights . . . .").
Id. at 219.
178.
See id. at 211 ("[T'here is no shared Israeli nation for all the citizens of the
179.
state. . . .")
See THE DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
180.
(Isr. 1948) ("THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish immigration and for the
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The increased divisiveness that characterizes Israeli society
compared to American society affects the High Court's
jurisprudence. 181 Although it took many years to achieve legal
equality among citizens of the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court
now bases its decisions on the precept that laws should apply equally
to all citizens.18 2 In Israel, an overarching Israeli identity does not
exist, and the High Court operates within the reality of group
identity. 8 3 It decides which individuals belong to which groups and
which laws apply to which groups. 184

IV. RELIGIOUS JURSPRUDENCE AS A REFLECTION OF NATIONAL
IDENTITY

American and Israeli religious jurisprudence reflect the
differences in the two states' conceptions of national identity.
Consistent with the liberal discourse that informs the U.S.
Constitution, religion remains a matter of individual conscience, free
from government interference in the United States. All religions,
including nonreligion, receive equal legal status.1 8 5 An individual's
membership in a religious group does not affect the individual's legal
entitlements or responsibilities. 186 Therefore, the Supreme Court
generally does not concern itself with religious identification and
classification. In Israel, on the other hand, a person's religious
affiliation has important legal consequences.1 87 The High Court must
decide how to divide individuals among religious groups. Religious
classification retains special importance for membership in the
Jewish community, the group to whom the state is dedicated.
Although the court's religious jurisprudence includes liberal rhetoric

Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of
all its inhabitants....").
181.
See, e.g., HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior, 16 PD 2428 [1962]
(Isr.), in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 15, at 1 (grappling with the Jewish
religious law as applied to a converted Jew and interpreting statutes in the Law of
Return and the Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance to have the secular meaning).
182.
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that
segregation of children in public schools based on race alone is unconstitutional).
183.
See Jacobsohn, supra note 38, at 174-75 (discussing the acceptance of
pluralism in Israel).
184.
See Edelman, supra note 1, at 218 (providing the Supreme Court's judicial
definition of a Jew).
185.
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
186.
See Jacobsohn, supra note 38, at 174-75 ("[Tlhe issues of equality over
which political conflict occurs tend to center on material concern rather than on the
more divisive issues of religion and morality.").
187.
See Smooha, supra note 80, at 205-07 (discussing the implications of the
Israeli state as an "ethnic democracy").

256

VANDERBILTJOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:-233

about individual rights, it remains grounded in the ethnocultural
discourse that pervades Israeli society.

A. American Separationof Religion and State
The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." 188 The Establishment Clause prohibits the
establishment of an official church. 189 The Free Exercise Clause
prohibits the government from regulating, penalizing, or rewarding
religious beliefs as such.190 Sometimes tension exists between the two
clauses. The Establishment Clause limits the government's ability to
distinguish between adherents and nonadherents, but the Free
Exercise Clause offers protection based on adherence to religion,
necessitating some distinction between the two groups. However,
both clauses protect religious freedom by ensuring that adherence or
nonadherence to any religion will not affect an individual's standing
in the national community.' 9 1 A citizen need not worry about being
more or less of a citizen based on religious choice. The clauses thus
work to maintain the private nature of religious identification. The
Court is not called upon to classify individuals as adherents of one
religion or another when deciding fundamental legal questions.
1.

Free Exercise Clause

Free exercise claims arise when generally applicable laws
require conduct that is incompatible with religious practice or
prohibit conduct required by religion.1 92 In those cases, the Court
93
must decide whether or not a religious exemption is required.'
Sometimes this requires an initial inquiry into the sincerity of a
claimant's religious belief. For instance, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a state
law penalized a member of the Old Order Amish for refusing to send
his daughter to school past the eighth grade.' 9 4 Before considering
whether the claimant could receive an exemption from the law based

U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 664-66 (1971) (White, J.,
191.
dissenting) (discussing the relationship between the First Amendment and the
Establishment Clause).
See, e.g. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79
192.
(1990) ("We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (considering the Amish
religion's impact on the law mandating school attendance for children).
See sources cited supra note 192.
193.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
194.
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on it impinging on his ability to freely exercise his religion, the Court
had to consider whether the claim was based on religious belief.19 5
For a claim to properly fall within the First Amendment, it
cannot rest on a purely personal or philosophical basis.196 In Yoder,
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, explained,
"Although ... what is a 'religious' belief or practice entitled to
constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the
very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to
make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a
whole has important interests." 197 He contrasted religious belief to "a
subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular
values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social
values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond .... ."198
However, the Court had no difficulty in concluding that the
traditional way of life of the Amish went beyond personal
preference. 199 Rather, it stemmed from deep religious conviction,
shared by an organized group. 200
Although the Court found it necessary to consider sincerity of
belief to determine whether the claim fell within the scope of the First
Amendment, it did not inquire into the truth or veracity of those
beliefs. 201 Moreover, the Court did not purport to define membership
in the Amish community, but rather accepted the claimant's selfidentification as Amish. 2 02 The determination of sincerity affected
whether or not an individual could be exempt from a law. 203 The
exemption applied equally to adherents of different religions, so long
as members of the religion sincerely held similar convictions. 204
Membership in the Amish community did not grant any special legal
entitlements or confer a privileged status in the national community.
The Supreme Court subsequently took a more negative view
toward religious exemptions, regardless of an individual's sincerity of
belief. In Department of Human Resources v. Smith, the Court found

195.
Id. at 215.
See id. ("[T]o have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must
196.
be rooted in religious belief.").
197.
Id. at 215-16.
198.
Id.
199.
Id. at 216.
200.
Id.
201.
See also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (finding that the First
Amendment barred submission to the jury of the truth or verity of respondents'
religious doctrine or beliefs, but not submission to the jury of the question whether the
defendants sincerely believed their representations).
202.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216 (requiring no objective determination of belief).
203.
See Smooha, supra note 80, at 220 (stating that informal, daily
discrimination against Arab citizens is particularly widespread in hiring practices for
white-collar jobs in the Jewish economy, in housing rentals, and in treatment by the
police).
204.
Id. at 219.
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that Oregon did not have to exempt religiously inspired peyote from
its general criminal prohibition on use of the drug. 205 Justice Scalia's
majority opinion noted that other states had enacted religious
exemptions to their drug laws. 206 However, he distinguished
permissible exemptions from constitutionally required exemptions. 207
He found that the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, though
protected against government interference, were not banned from the
political process. 20 8 Recognizing the risk that the political process
would place less popular religious practices at a disadvantage, he
stated, "unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or
in whi( judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the
centrality of all religious beliefs."20 9
Next, the conscientious objector cases required the Supreme
Court to tackle the definition of "religious belief' found in the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948.210 The Act
allowed exemption from combatant military service for individuals
who were conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form
by reason of their religious training and belief.211 It defined religious
belief as "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation, but ... not
includ[ing] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or
a merely personal moral code." 212
In United States v. Seeger, the Supreme Court exempted an
individual who stated that he preferred to leave his belief in a
Supreme Being open.21 3 He stated his beliefs as, "goodness and virtue
for their own sakes . . . a religious faith in a purely ethical
214
The
creed . . . without belief in God, except in the remotest sense."

Court interpreted belief in a Supreme Being broadly, articulating the
test as "whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful
occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the

Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
205.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
208.
See id. (discussing how judges may need to weigh the importance of the law
against religious beliefs).
Id. Congress attempted to restore the compelling-interest test previously
209.
used in cases such as Yoder, which Smith repudiated, in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (2006). The Court found the statute invalid as
applied to states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). It has not addressed
the legitimacy of the statute's application to the federal government.
210.
50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1964), amended by Military Selective Service Act of
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 7, 81 Stat. 100, 104 (1967).
211.
Id.
212.
Id.
213.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
214.
Id.
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orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the
exemption." 215
In Welsh v. United States, 2 16 the Supreme Court went so far as to
allow an exemption despite the fact that the registrant had struck the
word "religious" on his application. Justice Black's plurality opinion
found that the religious exemption clearly excluded two groups of
registrants: those whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose
objection to war rests solely upon considerations of policy,
pragmatism, or expediency. 2 17 It did not exclude, however, "those who
hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even
those whose conscientious objection . . . is founded to a substantial

extent upon considerations of public policy," so long as the objection
218
had some basis in moral, ethical, or religious principle.
Like the exemption in the Amish case, the religious exemption at
issue in these cases offers a benefit to adherents of religion that it
does not grant to those who do not adhere to any religion. Even
interpreting the term as broadly as possible, the language of the 1948
statute necessitates drawing the line somewhere. Justice Harlan,
concurring in Welsh, found the distinction between theistic and
nontheistic beliefs, on the one hand, and secular beliefs, on the other
hand, to violate the Establishment Clause. 2 19 While the majority did
not address the issue, Justice Harlan's point highlights the tension
between the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses. However, an
essential difference remains between determining whether a person
qualifies for protection based on freedom of religion on the one hand,
and determining the definition of the religion to which a person
belongs, on the other.
In each of the cases involving religious exemptions, the effect of
the Court's decision on the individual rights is relatively narrow: the
individual is granted an exemption from complying with a particular
provision of law. The individual is not granted a different level of
citizenship based on a designation of religious or not religious.
2.

Establishment Clause

James Madison, in protest of the renewal of Virginia's tax
support for the state's established church, argued, "[T]he best interest
of a society required that the minds of men always be wholly free; and
that cruel persecutions were the inevitable result of governmentestablished religions." 220 Madison's statement captures the purpose

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
Id. at 342-43.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947).
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behind the Establishment Clause. Beyond simply prohibiting the
establishment of an official church, the clause helps to ensure that
the government does not act in a way that prioritizes one religion
over another, or religion over nonreligion, so that no citizen receives a
privileged position in the national community on the basis of religious
choice. 221 It protects an individual's religious freedom indirectly, by
making sure that benefits and penalties are not linked to religion.2 22
The Supreme Court cases addressing the Establishment Clause focus
on the actions of the government, not individuals. 223 Before exploring
whether the clause applies to an action, the Court must determine
whether the action can be fairly attributed to the government.224
Individuals remain free to express their religious beliefs publically if
they so choose. 225
The Establishment Clause cases demonstrate the difficulty of
defining the scope of permissible government action. For example, the
cases do not categorically prohibit the government from displaying
symbols with religious significance. In Lynch v. Donnelly, the
Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a city's erection of a cr~che in
a public park as part of a Christmas display. 226 The Court explained
its aversion to a rigid, absolutist view of the Establishment Clause by
acknowledging the important role played by religion in American life
throughout the state's history.227 Chief Justice Burger wrote, "Our
history is replete with official references to the value and invocation
of Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the
Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders." 228 He listed the
proclamation of Christmas and Thanksgiving as national holidays in
religious terms, the national motto "In God We Trust," and the
reference to "one nation under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance to the
American flag as examples.2 2 9 Thus, the Court rejected a per se rule
that would indiscriminately invalidate all governmental conduct that
conferred benefits or gave special recognition to religion in general or
to one faith in particular.2 30 Rather, the Court looked at the context of
the display as a whole to determine whether it had a secular purpose,

221.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.").
222.
See id.
223.
See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (finding a
permanent monument in a public park to constitute government speech).
224.
See id. at 467-70 (explaining the importance of determining whether a city
was engaging in its own expressive conduct).
225.
Id. at 469.
465 U.S. 668.
226.
227.
Id. at 675-79.
228.
Id. at 675. .
229.
Id. at 675-79.
230.
Id. at 678.
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whether its primary effect was to advance or inhibit religion, and
whether it created an excessive entanglement of government with
religion. 231
The Supreme Court has applied a number of different
approaches in drawing the line between permissible and
impermissible government behavior with respect to religion and has
sometimes reached contrary conclusions on cases with fairly similar
fact patterns. 2 32 But wherever courts draw the line on any particular
occasion, the Establishment Clause helps to maintain the United
States' status as a country of all its citizens. Justice O'Connor, in her
concurring opinion in Lynch, articulated the purpose of the
Establishment Clause as prohibiting the government "from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in
the political community." 233 Courts stand as a guard against
endorsement, because endorsement would "send[] a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
234
they are insiders, favored members of the political community."
Justice O'Connor also noted that, on the other hand, disapproval of
religion sends the opposite message.s35 The harm from both messages
comes from segregating citizens on the basis of religious belief.
Therefore, separating religious life from political life enforces the
belief that the American nation belongs to all its citizens and fosters a
unified sense of American national identity.
B. Israeli Entwinement of Religion and State
The Brother Daniel case provides a vivid example of the
important role that the Jewish religion plays in Israel's national
identity and jurisprudence. 236 Even as the High Court differentiated
the secular civil law that applied to all citizens from the religious law
applied by Rabbinical Courts to matters of personal status for Jewish

231.
Id. at 678-79. The Court applied the Lemon test, first articulated in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
232.
Compare McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding
the display of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky county courthouses
unconstitutional), with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding a display of
the Ten Commandments on Texas State Capitol grounds constitutionally permissible).
233.
465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
234.
Id. at 688.
235.
Id.
See HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior, 16 PD 2428 [1962] (Isr.)
236.
in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 15, at 1 (denying a person of Jewish ancestry
access to a streamlined naturalization process available to Jewish immigrants because
he had converted to Catholicism).
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citizens, the court's reasoning demonstrated the inextricable links
between the secular law and Jewish religion. 23 7
The case stood before the High Court in 1950, before the 1970
Amendment to the Law of Return that defined "Jew" as "a person
who was born of a Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism
and who is not a member of another religion." 238 The High Court
needed to interpret the Law of Return's simple opening statement:
"Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh. 239"
Without a legislative definition for guidance, the court faced the
challenge of deciding whether Brother Daniel, an individual born to
Jewish parents who converted to a different religion, could be
considered a Jew under the law.240
The court considered and rejected two opposing definitions of
Jew, both of which would have classified Brother Daniel as a Jew.
First, Justice Silberg declined to interpret the term in accordance
with Orthodox religious law. 241 Under Halakha, a Jew who converts
or becomes an apostate remains a Jew. 242 Justice Silberg found that
the term acquired different meaning in the Law of Return than it did
in the Rabbinical Courts. 243 The difference stemmed from the fact
that the Law of Return, unlike laws governing personal status issues,
was a secular law of the state. 244 The secular nature of the law
necessitated interpreting its terms according to their "ordinary
meaning," taking into consideration the legislative purpose behind its
enactment. 245 In divining the ordinary meaning of "Jew," Justice
Silberg found it appropriate to inquire into the customary
understanding of the term by Jews. 246 He reasoned, "they are nearest
to the subject matter of the Law, and who better than they know the
essential content of the term 'Jew'?" 247 He did not explain who
constituted the Jewish community that best knew the essential

See id.
237.
238.
Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114, § 4B, (1949-1950) (Isr.), amended by
Law of Return (Amendment 5730-1970).
Id. § 1. An oleh is a Jew who has completed aliyah, or immigration to
239.
Israel.
See Rufeisen, 16 PD 2428, in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 15, at 1, 1
240.
(reviewing the state of the case).
See id. at 10 (distinguishing the use of the term Jew in secular law from its
241.
use in religious law).
242.
See id. at 3 ("According to the prevailing opinion in Jewish law ... a Jew
who is converted or becomes an apostate continues to be treated as a Jew for all
purposes save perhaps as to certain 'marginal' laws which have no real importance
with regard to the central problem.").
Id. at 10.
243.
Id.
244.
Id.
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
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content of the term. But since he rejected a definition in conformance
with Halakha,the group was not restricted to Orthodox Jews.24 8
Justice Silberg also rejected Brother Daniel's proffered definition
of Jew, a completely subjective conception whereby a person "who still
feels and regards himself as a Jew in spite of his conversion" would
qualify. 249 Although departing from Orthodox religious law, the court
found that the term Jew, in its ordinary meaning, would not be
completely divorced from the Jewish religion.25 0 The court's reasoning
centered around the central role played by the Jewish religion in
binding the Jewish people as a community and forming the state's
national identity. 25 1 Justice Silberg summarized the ties between the
Jewish people, Jewish religion, and the state of Israel:
Whether he is religious, non-religious or anti-religious, the Jew living
in Israel is bound, willingly or unwillingly, by an umbilical cord to
historical Judaism from which he draws his language and its idiom,
whose festivals are his own to celebrate, and whose great thinkers and
252
spiritual heroes . .. nourish his national pride.

As an adherent of a different religion, Brother Daniel's love for Israel
would be "from without-the love of a distant brother."25 3
Though Justice Silberg dismissed the petitioner's argument that
refusal to recognize him as a Jew would transform Israel into a
theocratic state, Justice Silberg emphasized that law, rather than
religion, regulated the lives of the nation's citizens. 254 However, the
nature of Israel's laws, which classify citizens based on ethnicity,
required the creation of legal distinctions between different ethnic
groups. Justice Silberg found religion to be an important component
of Jewish ethnicity because it offered a clear external sign to
distinguish the Jewish population from the non-Jewish population. 255
He explicitly articulated the connection between individual religious
identity and the national Jewish identity. 256 By binding together the
Jewish people, the Jewish religion played a central role in creating

248.
See id. (rejecting the Rabbinical Court's definition of Jew as applied to the
Law of Return).
See id. at 3, 11-13 (acknowledging the subjective test for the definition of
249.
Jew in his identification of the issue and rejecting such a test by ultimately holding
that Rufeisen was not Jewish).
250.
Id. at 12-13.
251.
Id.
252.
Id. at 11.
253.
Id.
See id. at 12 (rejecting the claim that Israel was as a theocratic state by
254.
emphasizing the court's reliance on secular-in contrast to religious-definitions of
Jewishness).
255.
Id.
Id. at 11.
256.
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and cementing Jewish national identity. 257 Justice Silberg quoted a
scholar who said:
Even the national idea, although it gave birth to the conception of
Jewish secular nationalism, could not sever at one stroke the ancient
bonds between Israel and its Torah, between the people and its sacred
law. On the contrary, national sentiment itself has endeavored to tie
258
these very bonds more tightly by nationalism."

Justice Cohn, agreeing with Justice Silberg, echoed the importance of
the Jewish ireligion to Israeli national identity.2 59 Justice Cohn found
that the Law of Return could not be construed to conflict with the
background and conception of the state. 260 Rather, he felt the court
had an obligation to interpret the law in a manner that would
promote the state's "prophetic vision and . . . aims." 261

The effect of Brother Daniel's exclusion from the group labeled
"Jews" went beyond intangible matters of self-identification. As a
Christian, Brother Daniel lacked entitlement to a number of legally
prescribed privileges, ranging from the ability to automatically obtain
citizenship to having access to the publically funded services provided
by the Jewish Agency and Jewish National Fund. 262 More
fundamentally, the decision affected the way he belonged to the state.
Although he received civil and political rights, such as voting rights
and the freedom to practice his religion, the state was not defined as
his homeland. 263 He did not fall within the class of citizens to which
the state dedicated its prophetic vision and aims. He could reside
within Israel, but only as a distant brother. By emphasizing common
ancestral heritage and continuity between a shared past and present,
the justices relied on an ethnocultural discourse at the expense of
liberal discourse. 264
Reliance on ethnocultural discourse is not unique to the Brother
Daniel case. Rather, it pervades the High Court's jurisprudence on
matters of religion. 265 Israel's law developed in a way that both

257.
Id.
Id. at 12 (quoting YEHEZKEL KAUFMANN,
258.
ALIENATION] 361 (1929-1932)).

GOLAH VENEKHAR [EXILE AND

See id. at 14 ("I agree further with Silberg J. when he says that 'we do not
259.
cut ourselves off from our historic past nor do we deny our ancestral heritage."'
(quoting id. at 11)).
Id. at 14.
260.
261.
Id.
262.
See Smooha, supra note 80, at 216-17 (describing the Jewish Agency and
the Jewish National Fund as institutions "obliged by their own constitutions to serve
Jews only").
263.

See THE DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

(Isr. 1948) (defining Israel as a Jewish state).
See Smith, supra note 17, at 228-40 (discussing different discourses of
264.
national identity).
See, e.g., HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, 23(2) PD 477 [19691
265.
(Isr.), in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 15, at 35 (deciding whether the Ministry of
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reflected the bond between Jewish religion and Jewish nationalism
and reinforced it. 266 It responded to social conditions whereby Jewish
citizens viewed themselves as part of a cohesive group and
concomitantly viewed other groups as outsiders.26 7 By codifying these
views in statutes that classify Jews as a unified group deserving of
unique entitlements, Israel's law also incentivized the perpetuation of
that mindset. On the one hand, cases such as Brother Daniel reacted
to that reality.26 8 The justices recognized the necessity of defining
who is a Jew in order to determine the scope of a law that confers
special privileges on Jews. 269 On the other hand, in making that
determination, the justices legitimated that reality by accepting that
an individual's religious identification constitutes a valid matter for
judicial review. 270 While professing the importance of liberal
individualistic values, the court nevertheless recognized the central
role played by religion in constructing and perpetuating the state's
Jewish national identity. 2 71 This role enabled religion to become a
valid consideration in determining individuals' legal entitlements.

V. LIMITS TO LIBERALIZING THE LAW IN ISRAEL

In some ways, the High Court plays an important role in
changing the religious status quo within Israel. When it challenges
the power of the Orthodox over Israeli citizens' lives, it alters the
existing balance of power whereby the Orthodox establishment wields
influence disproportionate to its size. The power to define the Jewish
community acts as an important tool in shaping the relationship
between religion and state within Israel. By ruling on the issue of
"who is a Jew," the High Court appropriates for itself the authority to
determine membership in the Jewish community. Previously, the

the Interior could legally refuse to register petitioner's children as "Of Jewish
nationality and without religion").
See SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 1, at 272-74 (discussing civil rights and
266.
Jewish ethnonationalism).
See Jacobsohn, supra note 38, at 174-75 (discussing Israel's greater legal
267.
recognition of cultural separateness and nonassimilation compared with the United
States).
268.
See HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior, 16 PD 2428 [1962] (Isr.),
in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 15, at 1 (denying a person of Jewish ancestry
access to a streamlined naturalization process available to Jewish immigrants because
he had converted to Catholicism).
See id. at 10-11, 14 (struggling to determine the appropriate test for
269.
defining Jew for the purposes of the Law of Return).
See id. at 11-13 (recognizing a strong link between religious identification
270.
and the secular legal definition of Jew, and finding Rufeisen's conversion to
Catholicism dispositive in holding him not Jewish for the purposes of the Law of
Return).
271.
See id.
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Orthodox rabbis retained sole authority over that determination. The
court therefore assumes power at the expense of the Orthodox
establishment. The court has used its power over religion to shift
toward individual freedom, whereby religious classification is largely
a matter of personal choice. In this way, the court has moved Israel
toward the American model, in which religion remains largely
separate from the state.
However, the High Court remains severely inhibited in its ability
to adopt the American model. In order to fully relegate matters of
religion to the realm of personal choice, the court would have to
remove religion from the authority of both the Orthodox and the
judiciary. It would have to declare the issue of individuals' religious
classification nonjusticiable. However, the fact that Israel's law
distributes entitlements and responsibilities on the basis of religious
identification necessitates a clear delineation of the different groups.
Moreover, in order for religion to truly be separate from the state, the
court would have to cease relying on the ethnocultural discourse of
citizenship that divides citizens into hierarchical religious groups.
However, Israel's legal structure encourages the continuation of this
discourse because Israel's laws do not treat citizens as members of
the same group. 272 Beginning with Israel's Declaration of
Independence, the state has been legally defined by group
membership. 273 This legal structure stems from deep, entrenched
divisions within Israeli society that encourage an "us" versus "them"
mentality, with "them" posing a threat to "us."2 74
Comparing American and Israeli constitutional jurisprudence on
matters of religion illustrates the limits to the Americanization of
Israel's law. In America, the constitutional principles of freedom of
religion and government neutrality toward religion form a core part
of American national identity, even if many citizens personally
identify with a particular religion.27 5 Free Exercise Clause cases only
examine the sincerity of an individual's religious beliefs to determine
if the individual comes within the clause's protection.2 7 6 A religious
See Smooha, supra note 80, at 216-17 (discussing the inadequacy of civil272.
liberties protections for Arabs in Israel).
273.
See THE DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
(Isr. 1948) (describing Israel as a Jewish state).
274.
See Jacobsohn, supra note 38, at 174-75 (discussing Israel's greater legal
recognition of cultural separateness and non-assimilation compared with the United
States).
See HUNTINGTON, supra note 14, at 23-30 (describing American national
275.
identity as rooted in political values as opposed to ethnicity or religion).
276.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (analyzing the
applicability of the Free Exercise Clause by considering the sincerity, but not the
merits, of the respondents' beliefs); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335-44
(1970) (reversing a Ninth Circuit decision upholding the rejection of a draft registrant's
application for conscientious objector status where the registrant's values, though not
religious, were strongly held).
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exemption to a law would apply equally to members of any religion.
The Establishment Clause cases focus on what the government may
or may not do.277 The prohibition on government preference for any
religious sect or religion over nonreligion protects all citizens from
feeling like outsiders in the political community on the basis of
religious belief, or lack thereof. Rather than distinguishing between
classes of citizens, the clause aims to ensure that religion does not
become the basis for unequal treatment.2 7 8 Defining the boundaries of
ethnic and religious groups is not the province of the judiciary.
In Israel, on the other hand, the High Court must distinguish
between citizens on the basis of religion because Israeli laws grant or
deny entitlements based on group identity. 279 In the Brother Daniel
case, the court did not follow the traditional Orthodox
interpretation.2 8 0 It expressed support for individual autonomy over
private matters such as religious identification. 281 However, the very
fact that the court needed to decide the issue demonstrates the public
nature of the religion. The court felt compelled to consider religion
because of the central role played by Orthodox Judaism in binding
the Jewish people together and defining the state's national
identity. 2 82 The decision, in turn, helped to reinforce the entwinement
between religion and state. A classification as Jewish entailed
different legal consequences than a classification as non-Jewish. The
determination of "who is a Jew" therefore had important
ramifications for the petitioner's individual rights.
So long as Israel remains a Jewish democracy, the High Court
will be constrained in its ability to alter the religion-state status quo.
It can erode the power of the Orthodox within the state, but it cannot
fully disentangle religion from state. Moreover, even if it could do so,
it would not likely choose to. The laws reflect an ethnocultural

See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (focusing on
277.
whether the government unit in question was engaging in its own expressive conduct).
278.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The
Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.").
279.
See HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior, 16 PD 2428 [1962] (Isr.)
in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 15, at 1 (denying a person of Jewish ancestry
access to a streamlined naturalization process available to Jewish immigrants because
he had converted to Catholicism).
See id. at 10 (declining to apply the religious definition of Jew to a secular
280.
law in adjudicating whether a person was entitled to a streamlined naturalization
process available to Jews).
See id. at 11 (recognizing a broad spectrum of beliefs within Israeli society,
281.
"from the extreme orthodox to the total agnostic").
See id. (recognizing the importance of religion to the Jewish identity, even
282.
as distinguished from the religious definition of Jew); see also SHAFIR & PELED, supra
note 1, at 149 ("While different tendencies in Zionism have tried, in varying degrees, to
endow the traditional religious themes with secular national meanings . . . they could
never be purged of their original religious content.").
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discourse that pervades Israeli society and influences the justices'
opinions, as evidenced by the rhetoric in the Brother Daniel case. 283
Although courts have some ability to catalyze social change through
court decisions, group separation and Jewish dominance remain
deeply entrenched aspects of Israeli national identity that could not
likely be changed by judicial decree.

VI. CONCLUSION

of American and Israeli constitutional
A comparison
jurisprudence highlights the limits to the Americanization of Israel's
law concerning matters of religion. While the United States adheres
to the constitutional principle of separation of religion and state,
religion plays a prominent role in Israel's national and legal identity.
Israel's Declaration of Independence defines the state as the
homeland of the Jewish people. Although all ethnicities and religions
enjoy representation and rights of citizenship, Israel's new
constitution remains committed to the definition of the state as a
Jewish nation. While the Jewish identity contains ethnic and cultural
dimensions, the Jewish religion has played an important role as a
historic source of legitimization for the Zionist project and a
continued source of connection between the Jewish people. The U.S.
Declaration of Independence and Constitution, on the other hand,
define the state as the nation of all American citizens, regardless of
ethnicity or religion. An individual's religious identification remains
beyond the reach of government interference.
The public versus private nature of religious identity points to
important differences in the national identities of Israel and the
United States. A liberal discourse of citizenship prevails in the
United States, which tends to conceptualize peoplehood in terms of
ideas and values. While religion certainly plays a role in public life,
the nation theoretically and legally belongs equally to citizens of all
religions. The Constitution does not differentiate between citizens on
the basis of religion. Ethnocultural discourse tends to play a more
prominent role in Israel, with peoplehood conceptualized in terms of
ancestral ties and shared group attributes. The laws reflect this
discourse by classifying citizens on the basis of religion and ethnicity.
Israel's High Court possesses some tools for reigning in the
power of the Orthodox rabbinate over public life in Israel. It can
ensure that the rabbinate cannot force individuals to follow religious
laws. It can dismantle certain discrete privileges, such as yeshiva
student deferments from the military. It can even make the definition
of "Jewish" more inclusive, such as by recognizing conversions

283.

See Rufeisen, 16 PD 2428, in SELECTED JUDGMENTS supra note 15, at 1.
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performed by non-Orthodox rabbis. However, it cannot fully
disentangle religion from the state. Orthodox Judaism has strong
roots in the formation of the nation. In a society with an "us" versus
"them" mentality, religion offers a relatively simple way to delineate
the boundary between the two. As long as religion continues to bind
and define the Jewish people, it will also define the nation formed to
serve that people. Even if the court continues to promote liberal,
individualistic values in other areas of law, religious matters will
continue to evoke the collectivist logic inherited from the earliest days
of Zionism.
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